Multipolar Civilisation Depends on Maintaining an Attacker’s Dilemma

·LessWrong··

A particular pattern of argument keeps appearing in security-focused circles: National security, cybersecurity, arms control/nonproliferation, global AI governance, sanctions enforcement and smuggling, or combating election fraud.The argument is that more often than not, attackers have the strategic advantage over defenders, and that in a world of actors who can choose to either cooperate or defect, this creates a game-theoretic structure with only defect-defect equilibria. Or in simpler terms: ...

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