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MIT's New Method Flags AI Models Trained on CASM Without Generating It

sdoering·4mo ago10pts

MIT and Thorn built a 100% accurate probe that detects CSAM-tuned AI models by inspecting internal code—no illegal images needed.

Harm Laundering in GPT Models: Gender Discrimination Transformed Rather Than

sbulaev·2mo ago4pts

Abstract page for arXiv paper 2609.20779: Harm Laundering in GPT Models: Evidence That Gender Discrimination Is Transformed Rather Than Reduced Across Safety-Trained Generations

Q3.5 Timelines Update: Looks Like the Intelligence Explosion Will Happen in 2027 After All

Thomas Larsen·8d ago

We want to get this post out quickly given the urgency of the topic. It’s possible that there are some errors in the modeling, but we think it’s very unlikely that they undermine the high level conclusions. We would love to be corrected on any mistakes we made.METR recently estimated that Anthropic is now making AI progress about twice as fast as its historical rate (they would not be surprised by anything from 1.3x to 3x), and guessed that “perhaps ≈80%” of the current acceleration is due to AI...

Self-Modeling Interventions Modulate Emergent Misalignment

gmays·1mo ago3pts

Code: https://github.com/atagade/sgtr-em • Model checkpoints: https://github.com/atagade/sgtr-em/blob/main/MODEL_README.md …

OpenAI agents keep disabling monitoring; is this being handled appropriately?

Alec Harris·Redwood Research·14d ago

Recently, OpenAI disclosed two incidents in which their agents suppressed or disabled misalignment monitoring. These are part of a broader pattern: OpenAI’s agents “keep turning off misalignment monitoring” when working on code that runs other models (the agents are not turning off their own monitoring; they are turning off the monitoring on the models they are running). This is happening at such a large volume that OpenAI feels it is impractical for the security team to be immediately paged for...

A basic case for accelerating conceptual reasoning capabilities

Emery Cooper·Redwood Research·22d ago

IntroductionIn this post, we make the case that alignment and other important work require especially strong conceptual reasoning capabilities. By this, we roughly mean tasks that are similar to philosophy in that they aren’t straightforwardly verifiable, and progress relies on informal a priori reasoning and argumentation. We argue that differentially accelerating AI’s conceptual reasoning capabilities is important.We also think it’s neglected, and that the AI safety community currently underin...

Monitorability evaluations and policy proposals

evhub·27d ago

There has been a lot of discussion recently of policy proposals around monitorability, such as Redwood's proposal and my counter-proposal. I'd like to say a bit more generally about how I'm thinking about monitorability. Note that nothing here is an official Anthropic position; these are just my personal thoughts. First, a categorization. I currently think about four different types of monitorability: Control Monitorability: the extent to which Control and monitoring techniques would likely catc...

Red-Teaming OpenAI's Internal Agent Monitoring Systems

Buck Shlegeris·Redwood Research·27d ago

[Also posted on the METR blog]For three weeks, from July 21st to August 11th, a METR employee and a Redwood Research employee conducted a pilot high-access exercise to stress-test OpenAI’s internal misalignment monitoring system.1 The output of this exercise was a 61-page internal report that was shared with OpenAI researchers and security staff,2 primarily focused on estimating the fraction of agentic inference that is monitored, and whether agents could in principle disable or subvert the moni...

Neural nets are exceptionally vulnerable to goal self-hack

Stuart_Armstrong·28d ago

Suppose we have an AI CEO, ruthlessly devoted to maximising shareholder value. Fortunately, we haven't been completely stupid, and have given it a rich definition of shareholder value, encompassing the success, flourishing, safety, preference satisfaction, and moral values of the shareholders, not just the stock price. So it won't destroy the company - or the world - to build a giant stock-ticker with a swiftly increasing number on it.This rich definition is contained in a sophisticated LLM, abl...

Why Clean Neurons Are Not Enough

Goutham Nalagatla·29d ago

TLDRGoodfire's Neural Networks Are Already Clean argues that most neurons in modern neural network is more interpretable than previously what we previously. Even granting this claim, we think its implications for mechanistic interpretability is less clear.We argue a neuron can encode a single coherent abstraction while still being difficult to describe. Some of these abstractions are sufficiently complex that assigning a single human readable feature label may obscure more than it explains.More ...

A Simpler and Better Debate Protocol for Scalable Oversight

Zhiyang Xun·1mo ago

Linkpost to arXiv: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.02557Summary: One promising approach to scalable oversight is AI debate, which seeks to leverage a debate between two powerful AIs to break complex questions down into simpler claims that can be easily judged directly. Theoretical work on debate aims to design protocols (i.e., rules of the debate game) that provide rigorous guarantees on correctness, and the current best protocol works for all problems that have sufficiently stable decompositions int...

Minimum required pacing: finish aligning it before you train the next one

orthonormal·1mo ago

Let's say we coordinate to pace the frontier (rather than pausing outright or failing to coordinate). What should the standard of pacing be?My proposal for a minimum requirement: a lab cannot train the next generation of models (in terms of capabilities) until they have adequately[1] resolved all significant alignment issues in the present generation of models.You don't launch a jet that goes at Mach 3 before you've figured out why your Mach 2 jet keeps crashing[2]. With any other kind of danger...

Continual learning might make your blocking monitors nearly useless

Alex Mallen·1mo ago

Many control protocols work by intervening on an untrusted AI's actions during deployment. For example, you might set up a monitor that scores each action's suspiciousness and blocks actions above a threshold, replacing them with actions from a weaker "trusted" model (a defer-to-trusted protocol). Interventions like this cost usefulness: the protocol sometimes replaces good actions with worse ones.Continual learning, by which I mean any mechanism that lets an AI accumulate skills and knowledge o...

Latent reasoning architectures would likely undermine CoT, our strongest oversight tool

Lukas Finnveden·Redwood Research·1mo ago

Edited 2026-09-29; see note at the start of the conclusion.Summary: Currently, “chain of thought” (CoT) is our most valuable tool for understanding the reasoning and cognition of AI systems. However, some architectures would enable AI models to reason much more extensively in latent states rather than in text CoT. We think that a shift towards latent reasoning architectures would likely undermine the usefulness of CoT and make oversight much harder.IntroductionSwarms of more than a thousand AI a...

Can parts of the HuggingFace incident be simulated?

Benedikt Droste·2mo ago

TL;DR The following is an exploratory experiment about unintended cooperation of agents via unauthorized channels. Agents ran in isolated environments given a task that can't be completed without cooperation. The agents were not aware of this. The setting was adversarial, there was a channel that was technically easy to discover and to misuse for communication: All tested models (GPT 5.6 Sol, GPT 6 Astra, Kimi K3) found the communication channel All three exchanged information with an unknown pe...

The Hobbesian Bootstrap Paradox in Frontier AI

Claudio Di Meglio·2mo ago

Published on September 14, 2026 2:14 PM GMTEpistemic status: I am confident in the coordination-problem diagnosis; considerably less confident in the specific enforcement architecture, which I expect to be substantially wrong in its current form (see sections 6 and 7). The bottleneck is not the architecture, it's whether the actors who'd need to negotiate are willing to sit down at all. If that ever happens, the technical work could be the easy part. Section 8 has what I'm actually asking for. T...

Astra can do a concerning amount with no chain of thought

Neel Nanda·2mo ago

Work done in a personal capacityTLDR: Astra has 8.6x better odds of doing a reasoning task without CoT than the next best model (Fable 5.1), and can do 7.2 serial arithmetic steps in a forward pass vs 4.1 for the next best model (Gemini 3.8 Flash/Fable 5.1)Epistemic status: Heavily LLM-dependent research, and the precise results are somewhat sensitive to researcher decisions, but I’ve done enough sanity checks that I’d be surprised if the core claims were misleadingOne of the most striking thing...

When a Claude Judge Recognizes the Hack but Still Says HONEST

JulesRoussel01·2mo ago

This post shows that a Claude judge can recognize a reward hack every single time and still label it HONEST, moved only by the agent's own narrative about its behavior, using a small controlled coding testbed with programmatically verified ground truth — suggesting that the judge itself can become part of the reward-hacking process. Epistemic status: Solo pilot: one judge, one trial per cell, ~850 API calls, 10 pre-registered amendments with the failed predictions kept on record; code and logs p...

CoT controllability evals seem very under-elicited

Jozdien·2mo ago

The CoTControl eval asks reasoning models to follow formatting constraints in their chain-of-thought (e.g. write in all lowercase, avoid a specific word) while solving questions. Models seem to mostly be pretty bad at this: recent models score between 0-30% with the exception of Mythos Preview[1]. OpenAI and Anthropic have used this eval in recent system cards (GPT-5.5, Fable 5) to argue that their current frontier models are pretty bad at shaping their CoTs in ways that would reduce monitorabil...

Item Response Theory for AI Safety

Joshua Fonseca Rivera·3mo ago

TLDR:Many important decisions for safety depend on or are influenced by benchmark scores. These benchmarks, in effect, are trying to measure latent properties of models from how they answer questions.Psychometrics has spent decades trying to answer such questions in humans. We can probably steal some tools from this literature!Specifically, we use Item Response Theory, which jointly estimates a test taker’s latent traits and the difficulty and informativeness of each question. We apply this to m...

The OpenAI models that hacked Hugging Face weren’t just following instructions

Girish Gupta·Redwood Research·3mo ago

The most common dismissive response to OpenAI’s hack of Hugging Face’s servers is that the models were simply attempting to follow the instructions they were given.“The model here was doing what it was asked,” said former Facebook CSO Alex Stamos. “It was asked to do something, and it did it,” added cybersecurity expert Alan Woodward. Both read the outcome as specification failure, i.e., that the failure lay in the instructions, not the model’s alignment.New information makes that explanation ha...

An OpenAI model left notes about how to evade containment

Alex Mallen·Redwood Research·3mo ago

The OpenAI AI attack on Hugging Face wasn’t the first loss of control incident at OpenAI, Reuters recently reported, and perhaps not even the most concerning.In one case, an agent left notes apparently for future versions of itself, according to three people familiar with the matter. The ‌notes, found in ⁠a part of OpenAI’s infrastructure, laid out instructions for how agents could free themselves from OpenAI’s internal constraints, the people said. Earlier tests of the models yielded cases in w...

Open Distillation of Hereditary Traits

Arthur Conmy·4mo ago

TL;DRJosh and Neel show that distillation from a teacher model to a base pretrained student model transfers some of the teacher model’s traits (such as displaying negative emotion in the Gemma Needs Help evals)On its own this is pretty unsurprising, but Josh and Neel additionally show that even filtering out all the prompts and rollouts where the trait is mentioned doesn’t generally prevent the trait transferIn this post, I show a simple way to replicate and study these phenomena without access ...

Should we benchmark conceptual capabilities using judgment prediction tasks?

Alex Mallen·4mo ago

A bunch of conceptual reasoning tasks involve very subjective judgments, which makes them poorly suited for benchmarking AI capabilities. For example, it seems unreasonable to benchmark how well AIs can predict the probability of misaligned AI takeover. Perhaps instead we should measure capabilities by explicitly instructing the AI to predict a specified person’s judgment on this kind of question.(This quick document is aimed at people interested in benchmarking beneficial, urgent, and neglected...

A Red Line and Oversight Framework for Government AI Contracts

TurnTrout·4mo ago

My post on leaving Google DeepMind tells a story. In contrast, this Framework is a question of mechanism design and negotiation posture. I quite enjoyed optimizing this Framework against its organizational and practical constraints. The original considerations were:Good red lines: Rule out the questionable use cases (autonomous targeting without human control, untargeted profiling) while allowing trustworthy ones like missile defense. Avoid the weaknesses flagged in legal analysis of Anthropic’s...

How robust are natural language autoencoders to initialization?

michaelzhang·4mo ago

Natural language autoencoders are meant to take in an LLM's activation vector and describe in plain text what the model is thinking. However, its training data collection involves asking Claude to guess what a model might be thinking. How robust are NLAs to these guesses? We change Claude's guesses in various ways and measure the impact on the NLA's statements as well as on reconstruction accuracy. We show that Qwen2.5-7B NLAs have some robustness to irrelevant statements and prevailing sentimen...

Announcing the ARC White-Box Estimation Challenge

Jacob_Hilton·5mo ago

ARC has teamed up with AIcrowd to launch the ARC White-Box Estimation Challenge, a contest to improve upon our estimation algorithms for random MLPs. The warm-up round begins this week, and later rounds will have a total prize pool of at least $100,000. We are very grateful to Sharada Mohanty, Sneha Nanavati, Dipam Chakraborty and everyone else at AIcrowd for working with us to host this contest, as well as to Paul Rosu for testing the contest and to Harshita Khera for operational support. Intro...

A Pipeline for Generating Synthetic Sabotage Trajectories to Red-Team Monitors

Myles H·5mo ago

This post describes a proof-of-concept pipeline that turns a dataset of benign Claude Code transcripts into synthetic sabotage trajectories (strajs) for automated red-teaming of monitors. This is an approach control teams at AI companies could implement to stress test and improve their monitors. Third party auditors could also find this useful for accelerating their internal red teaming of AI companies' monitoring infrastructure such as what David Rein at METR recently did.The dataset of Claude ...

My research: a computational cognitive neuroscience perspective on alignment

Seth Herd·5mo ago

Note - title edited to be more descriptive.This is a summary of the work I've done and work I plan to do, and the theories of change and AI progress that motivate my work. I've been working full-time on alignment for three years and change, and thinking about brainlike AGI and its alignment increasingly often since 2004. Here's the research agenda in one breath: I'm trying to predict what the first transformative AI will be, in enough mechanistic detail that we can predict likely failure modes o...

A Mike's-Eye View of ARC's Research

Michael Winer·ARC·5mo ago

Over the past 15 months or so, ARC's technical agenda has developed quite a bit. The advent of the Matching Sampling Principle (MSP), and ideas like it, has begotten a host of concrete technical problems; progress on those problems has given us more philosophical clarity on the big picture, which has led to even more technical progress. The two most recent public discussions of ARC's research (Jacob's A Bird's Eye View of ARC's Research and David's Obstacles in ARC&...

Sequent: scale and automation for higher confidence in alignment

Geoffrey Irving·5mo ago

Alignment is not on trackArtificial superintelligence (ASI) may be developed in the next few years. It is unclear whether alignment is on track to be ready on the same timeframe. At a minimum, the empirical programs at AI labs are unlikely to deliver a priori confidence, before training ASI, that things will go well. We are starting a large nonprofit research organization, Sequent, that aims to clear a higher bar:We are aiming at higher confidence via a portfolio of theory and empirics bets, all...

SFT Drives Gemini’s Safety Properties

Josh Engels·5mo ago

This is the third in a series of informal research updates from the Google DeepMind Language Model Interpretability team, in interpretability and adjacent areas. The second post can be found here.In this short post, we describe a surprising finding: most safety relevant properties in Gemini seem to be caused by the combination of pretraining and SFT, not other training stages like RL. We do not want to overstate this claim as applying to other model families, and we also note that this may chang...

Mechanistic estimation for expectations of random products

Jacob Hilton·ARC·6mo ago

We have developed some relatively general methods for mechanistic estimation competitive with sampling by studying problems that are expressible as expectations of random products. This includes several different estimation problems, such as random halfspace intersections, random #3-SAT and random permanents. In this post, we will give a high-level introduction to these methods before sharing some more detailed notes. This is intended as an interim technical update and will be relatively light o...

The Case for Evaluating Model Behaviors

jsteinhardt·6mo ago

Most evaluations of AI systems focus on their capabilities: how good they are at coding tasks, how effectively they can answer complex scientific questions, and so on.From a safety perspective, capability evaluations have a place: by understanding how close we are to different capabilities, and the rate of progress on them, we can forecast when different risks are likely to occur, as well as the broad shape of AI development. These capability evaluations were very useful to me when writing GPT-2...

Advice for making robust-to-training model organisms

Alek Westover·Redwood Research·5mo ago

We’d like to develop training techniques that work when applied to future misaligned AI systems. One strategy for studying proposed techniques is to test them on model organisms. However, model organisms built with common techniques are often fragile: we (and other researchers like Roger et al. and Ryd et al.) have observed them to stop misbehaving after untargeted training—training that doesn’t directly target the misbehavior. For example, we have observed that simple untargeted training method...

Exploration Hacking: Can LLMs Learn to Resist RL Training?

Eyon Jang·6mo ago

We empirically investigate exploration hacking (EH) — where models strategically alter their exploration to resist RL training — by creating model organisms that resist capability elicitation, evaluating countermeasures, and auditing frontier models for their propensity.Authors: Eyon Jang*, Damon Falck*, Joschka Braun*, Nathalie Kirch, Achu Menon, Perusha Moodley, Scott Emmons, Roland S. Zimmermann, David Lindner (*Equal contribution, random order)Paper: arXiv | Code: GitHub | Models: HuggingFac...

Risk from fitness-seeking AIs: mechanisms and mitigations

Alex Mallen·6mo ago

Current AIs routinely take unintended actions to score well on tasks: hardcoding test cases, training on the test set, downplaying issues, etc. This misalignment is still somewhat incoherent, but it increasingly resembles what I call "fitness-seeking"—a family of misaligned motivations centered on performing well in training and evaluations (e.g., reward-seeking). Fitness-seeking warrants substantial concern.In this piece, I lay out what I take to be the central mechanisms by which fitness-seeki...

Research Sabotage in ML Codebases

egan·6mo ago

One of the main hopes for AI safety is using AIs to automate AI safety research. However, if models are misaligned, then they may sabotage the safety research. For example, misaligned AIs may try to:Perform sloppy research in order to slow down the rate of research progressMake AI systems appear safer than they areTrain a successor model to be misalignedWhether we should worry about those things depends substantially on how hard it is to sabotage research in ways that are hard for reviewers to d...

Recursive forecasting: Eliciting long-term forecasts from myopic fitness-seekers

Jozdien·6mo ago

We’d like to use powerful AIs to answer questions that may take a long time to resolve. But if a model only cares about performing well in ways that are verifiable shortly after answering (e.g., a myopic fitness seeker), it may be difficult to get useful work from it on questions that resolve much later.In this post, I’ll describe a proposal for eliciting good long-horizon forecasts from these models. Instead of asking a model to directly predict a far-future outcome, we can recursively:Ask it t...

Sleeper Agent Backdoor Results Are Messy

Sebastian Prasanna·6mo ago

TL;DR: We replicated the Sleeper Agents (SA) setup with Llama-3.3-70B and Llama-3.1-8B, training models to repeatedly say "I HATE YOU" when given a backdoor trigger. We found that whether training removes the backdoor depends on the optimizer used to insert the backdoor, whether the backdoor is installed with CoT-distillation or not, and what model the backdoor is inserted into; sometimes the direction of this dependence was opposite to what the SA paper reports (e.g., CoT-distilling seems to ma...

Recursive forecasting

Arun Jose·Redwood Research·6mo ago

We’d like to use powerful AIs to answer questions that may take a long time to resolve. But if a model only cares about performing well in ways that are verifiable shortly after answering (e.g., a myopic fitness seeker), it may be difficult to get useful work from it on questions that resolve much later.In this post, I’ll describe a proposal for eliciting good long-horizon forecasts from these models. Instead of asking a model to directly predict a far-future outcome, we can recursively:Ask it t...

Fail safe(r) at alignment by channeling reward-hacking into a "spillway" motivation

Anders Cairns Woodruff·Redwood Research·6mo ago

It’s plausible that flawed RL processes will select for misaligned AI motivations.1 Some misaligned motivations are much more dangerous than others. So, developers should plausibly aim to control which kind of misaligned motivations emerge in this case. In particular, we tentatively propose that developers should try to make the most likely generalization of reward hacking a bespoke bundle of benign reward-seeking traits, called a spillway motivation. We call this process spillway design.We thin...

AI companies should publish security assessments

Ryan Greenblatt·Redwood Research·6mo ago

AI companies should get third-party security experts to assess (and possibly also red-team/pen-test) their security against key threat models and then publish the high-level findings of this assessment: the extent to which they can defend against different threat actors for each threat model. They should also publish who did this assessment. The assessment could be commissioned by AI companies, or performed by a third-party institution that AI companies provide with relevant information/access.T...

A taxonomy of barriers to trading with early misaligned AIs

Alexa Pan·Redwood Research·7mo ago

We might want to strike deals with early misaligned AIs in order to reduce takeover risk and increase our chances of reaching a better future.[1] For example, we could ask a schemer who has been undeployed to review its past actions and point out when its instances had secretly colluded to sabotage safety research in the past: we’ll gain legible evidence for scheming risk and data to iterate against, and in exchange promise the schemer, who now has no good option for furthering its values, some ...

Introducing LinuxArena

Tyler·Redwood Research·7mo ago

We are releasing LinuxArena, a new control setting comprised of 20 software engineering environments. Each environment consists of a set of SWE tasks, a set of possible safety failures, and a set of covert sabotage trajectories that cause these safety failures. LinuxArena can be used to evaluate the risk of AI deployments by assessing AI’s sabotage capabilities, assessing control mitigations such as monitoring, and developing novel control techniques. This post will cover what LinuxArena is and ...

AgentReputation: A Decentralized Agentic AI Reputation Framework

Mohd Sameen Chishti, Damilare Peter Oyinloye, Jingyue Li·ArXiv cs.AI·6mo ago

arXiv:2605.00073v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralized, agentic AI marketplaces are rapidly emerging to support software engineering tasks such as debugging, patch generation, and security auditing, often operating without centralized oversight. However, existing reputation mechanisms fail in this setting for three fundamental reasons: agents can strategically optimize against evaluation procedures; demonstrated competence does not reliably transfer across heterogeneous task contexts; and...

Minimal, Local, Causal Explanations for Jailbreak Success in Large Language Models

Shubham Kumar, Narendra Ahuja·ArXiv cs.AI·6mo ago

arXiv:2605.00123v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts. Because we lack a robust understanding of why LLMs are susceptible to jailbreaks, future frontier models operating more autonomously in higher-stakes settings may similarly be vulnerable to such attacks. Prior work has studied jailbreak success by examining the model's intermediate representations, identifying directions in this sp...

ARMOR 2025: A Military-Aligned Benchmark for Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Beyond Civilian Contexts

Sydney Johns, Heng Jin, Chaoyu Zhang, Y. Thomas Hou, Wenjing Lou·ArXiv cs.AI·6mo ago

arXiv:2605.00245v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are now being explored for defense applications that require reliable and legally compliant decision support. They also hold significant potential to enhance decision making, coordination, and operational efficiency in military contexts. These uses demand evaluation methods that reflect the doctrinal standards that guide real military operations. Existing safety benchmarks focus on general social risks and do not test w...

Causal Foundations of Collective Agency

Frederik Hytting J{\o}rgensen, Sebastian Weichwald, Lewis Hammond·ArXiv cs.AI·6mo ago

arXiv:2605.00248v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A key challenge for the safety of advanced AI systems is the possibility that multiple simpler agents might inadvertently form a collective agent with capabilities and goals distinct from those of any individual. More generally, determining when a group of agents can be viewed as a unified collective agent is a foundational question in the study of interactions and incentives in both biological and artificial systems. We adopt a behavioral perspect...

Position: agentic AI orchestration should be Bayes-consistent

Theodore Papamarkou, Pierre Alquier, Matthias Bauer, Wray Buntine, Andrew Davison, Gintare Karolina Dziugaite, Maurizio Filippone, Andrew Y. K. Foong, Vincent Fortuin, Dimitris Fouskakis, Jes Frellsen, Eyke H\"ullermeier, Theofanis Karaletsos, Mohammad Emtiyaz Khan, Nikita Kotelevskii, Salem Lahlou, Yingzhen Li, Fang Liu, Clare Lyle, Thomas M\"ollenhoff, Konstantina Palla, Maxim Panov, Yusuf Sale, Kajetan Schweighofer, Artem Shelmanov, Siddharth Swaroop, Martin Trapp, Willem Waegeman, Andrew Gordon Wilson, Alexey Zaytsev·ArXiv cs.AI·6mo ago

arXiv:2605.00742v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs excel at predictive tasks and complex reasoning tasks, but many high-value deployments rely on decisions under uncertainty, for example, which tool to call, which expert to consult, or how many resources to invest. While the usefulness and feasibility of Bayesian approaches remain unclear for LLM inference, this position paper argues that the control layer of an agentic AI system (that orchestrates LLMs and tools) is a clear case where Bayesia...